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STANDING TO SUE IN ANTITRUST:
THE APPLICATION OF DATA PROCESSING
TO PRIVATE TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen an unmistakeable trend toward relaxing the
requirements of standing in the federal courts.- The thrust of this
movement, spearheaded by several Supreme Court decisions, 2 has been
to grant standing where it would have been doubtful under prior law.
Yet, despite six decades of unresolved controversy, the Supreme Court
has failed to give a definitive treatment to the rigid standing require-
ments under section 4 of the Clayton Act.8 Much criticism has been
leveled at the harshness of these judicially imposed standing rules and
1. See, e.g., Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. Rav. 450
(1970); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HAxv. L. REv. 633 (1971); Scott, Standing in the Su-
preme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 NA-v. L. REV. 645 (1973).
2. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972) (denied standing, but set liberal standing precedent for later environmental-
ist litigation); Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Arnold Tours,
Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association
of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968). Contra
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). The section provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found
or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall re-
cover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
Justice Frankfurter's statement that standing is a "complicated speciality of the fed-
eral courts" takes on particular significance in light of the section 4 experience, primar-
ily due to the Supreme Court's repeated denial of certiorari. See, e.g., In re Multidistrict
Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Rei-
bert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 411 U.S. 938
(1973); Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d
1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Kauffman v. Dreyfus
Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); South Caro-
lina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 934 (1966); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d
564 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834 (1963); Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry
Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Coast
v. Hunt Oil Co., 195 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952); Miley
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam,
242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957).
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the uncertainty surrounding their application.4 Clear splits have devel-
oped among the lower federal courts in their attempts to define the
appropriate class of section 4 claimants and no single rationale has
emerged from this confusing collection of authority.
Recently, a distinct departure was made from the traditional no-
tions of standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act. In the case of
Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp.,5 the Sixth Circuit took a major step
toward incorporating the "liberalized law of standing" into the private
sector of antitrust law. Likening a private antitrust action to a public
suit, the court adopted the liberal two-pronged standing test enunciated
in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.0
This comment concerns the application of Data Processing to section 4
of the Clayton Act and whether this new approach affords a sensible
accommodation to the troubled law of private treble damage standing.
I1. THE CAUSAL CONNECTION CONFUSION
A. THE LIMITING LANGUAGE
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that any person "injured in
his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
4. See, e.g., Beane, Antitrust: Standing and Passing On, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 331
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Beane]; Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements
of a Treble-Damage Antitrust Action, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 691 (1962) fhereinafter cited
as Pollock]; Note, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton
Act, 64 COLTum. L. REv. 570 (1964) [hereinafter cited as COLUM. L. Rnv.]; Comment,
Standing under Clayton § 4: A Proverbial Mystery, 77 DiCK. L. REv. 73 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as DicK. L. REv.]; Note, Antitrust--Standing to Sue Under Section 4
of the Clayton Act, 35 Oino ST. L.J. 723 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Omio ST. L.J.].
5. 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
6. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Data Processing involved a private challenge of govern-
mental action under section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1970), which provides: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant stat-
ute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."
The question before the Court was whether sellers of data processing services had
standing to challenge a ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency allowing national
banks to provide such services, despite the Bank Service Corporation Act's mandate that
"[n]o bank service corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance
of bank services for banks." 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1970). The district court and the court
of appeals had denied standing to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting
traditional standing tests because they necessitated an examination of the merits. Ac-
cordingly, a new test was fashioned: whether the complainant alleges injury in fact and
"whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee
in question." 397 U.S. at 153. Applying this two-pronged test to the facts, the Court
concluded that the plaintiffs had standing, since they alleged economic injury and the
relevant statute (section 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1864
(1970)) arguably brought banking competitors within its zone of interests.
1976]
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laws . . . ." may maintain a private action for treble damages.7 De-
spite this seemingly broad wording, the lower federal courts have histori-
cally restricted the applicability of section 4, fearful of the nearly
limitless possibilities that a literal interpretation would afford. As a
result the federal courts are in agreement that not every person injured
by reason of an antitrust violation is entitled to treble damages.8 To
effectuate this policy narrow judicial interpretations of section 4 stand-
ing have focused upon the statutory phrases "business or property" and
"by reason of." Thus, the private plaintiff seeking treble damages must
establish not only an injury to his "business or property," but also that
there is a causal connection of sufficient directness between the two-
that he was injured directly "by reason of" the antitrust violation.9
As it has been interpreted by the lower federal courts, the second
requirement has become the most significant restriction of the statute.10
One writer has observed that "[c]ausal connection is such a haunting
and evasive phrase that it will possibly never be understood to any
explainable point."'" This elusive requirement has resulted in a multi-
tude of decisions in the lower federal courts, "sometimes based on policy
considerations, sometimes based on categorizing types of plaintiffs,
sometimes based on judge-made concepts . *..."11 reaching a variety of
different results,' 3 and creating so much confusion "that no one, other
than a direct competitor, can be assured that he has been injured by
7. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
8. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262-63 n.14 (1972).
9. See, e.g., Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d
Cir. 1910).
10. See Klingsberg, Bull's Eyes and Carom Shots: Complications and Conflicts
on Standing to Sue and Causation Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 16 ANTiTRUsr
BuLL. 351, 355 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Klingsberg]. For a discussion of the
prerequisite "business or property," see Blackford, "Business or Property" Entitled to
Protection Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 26 MERcER L. REV. 737 (1975).
11. Thomas, The Sellers of Labor and Corporate Mergers, 48 NoTR DAME LAWYER
623, 639 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Thomas].
12. G. RPYcRAr, TREBLE DAMAoE ACTroNS 116 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
REYCRAFrI.
13. Compare, e.g., Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971), with Fields Prods., Inc. v. United Artists
Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971); and Congress Building Corp. v. Loew's, Inc.,
246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957), with Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 890 (1956); and Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry
Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963), with
South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966).
[Vol. 11: 542
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reason of the violation."' 4  Consequently, the central issue in section 4
standing cases is not the type of injury that has been suffered, but the
directness of that injury. Unfortunately, the courts disagree as to what
constitutes a sufficiently direct causal connection and along this line two
independent approaches have developed.
B. THE DIRECT INJURY APPROACH AND THE
TARGET AREA APPROACH
Two analytical techniques, popularly known as the "direct injury"
and "target area!' tests, represent the competing theories applied by the
federal courts in treble damage decisions. The genesis of the direct
injury approach is generally considered to be the 1910 case of Loeb v.
Eastman Kodak Co.'5 There the court denied standing to a stockholder
of a photographic supply house which was forced out of business by the
illegal conduct of the defendant, Eastman Kodak. The court held that
the cause of action could only accrue to the corporation, and not the
plaintiff stockholder, since any damage suffered by him was "indirect,
remote, and consequential."' 6
Analytically, the direct injury test focuses on the relationship be-
tween the antitrust violator and the plaintiff-and "if the victim and the
perpetrator are separated by an intermediary party, standing is usually
denied .... ,"1 The simplicity of this test, however, belies the
uncertainty which surrounds its application. By reviving notions of
privity to aid in distinguishing derivative injuries from those that are
direct, this test has tended to establish categories of plaintiffs who may
and may not sue under the antitrust laws.'" Accordingly, this test has
14. DicK. L. REv., supra note 4, at 74 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
15. 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910). See also Ames v. American Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 166 F. 820 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909). Both of these were actions brought by share-
holders under section 7 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 210 (1890), repealed by
Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 283, the forerunner of section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act.
16. 183 F. at 709.
17. Beane, supra note 4, at 333.
18. The following categories are representative of plaintiffs whose injuries have be-
come presumptively remote under this analysis:
-Shareholders of Injured corporations. See, e.g., Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434
F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); Bookout v. Schine Chain
Theatres, Inc., 253 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1958); Martens v. Barrett, 245 F.2d 844 (5th Cir.
1957); Peter v. Western Newspaper Union, 200 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1953).
-- Officers of Injured corporations. See, e.g., Sargent v. National Broadcasting Co., 136
F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
30 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), affd per curiam, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940); Gerli
v. Silk Ass'n of America, 36 F.2d 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
19761
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been criticized for arbitrarily foreclosing otherwise meritorious claims."9
Conversely, the target area approach focuses on the plaintiff's
relationship to the area of the economy injured by the antitrust violation.
The vanguard decision of this approach was Conference of Studio
Unions v. Loew's, Inc.2" In Loew's the target area approach was
enunciated as follows:
In order to state a cause of action under the anti-trust laws
a plaintiff must show more than that one purpose of the
conspiracy was a restraint of trade and that an act has been
-Employees of Injured Corporations. See, e.g., Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471
F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973) (employees terminated as a
result of illegal merger); Centanni v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. La.),
aff'd per curiam, 323 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1963); Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of America, 36 F.2d
959 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
-Suppliers of Injured Manufacturers. See, e.g., Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry
Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Snow
Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956).
-Lessors of Injured Tenants. See, e.g., Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d
518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 890 (1956); Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes,
Inc., 221 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), arfd, 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964); Harrison
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1953), a!f'd per curiam, 211
F.2d 405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
-Patentees of Injured Licensees. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 407
F.2d 166 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969); Productive Inventions, Inc. v.
Trico Prods. Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956).
-Creditors. See, e.g., Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299
(D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828
(1957); Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of America, 36 F.2d 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
-Franchisors. See, e.g., Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971); Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv., Inc. v. As-
sociation of Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967).
-Ultimate Consumers. See generally Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
392 U.S. 481 (1968).
19. See Guilfoil, Private Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Law, 10 ANTrrusT BuLL.
747 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Guilfoil]. "Distance from an antitrust violation should
not dictate judicial disenchantment with a plaintiff's cause; only the absence of provable
injury should be permitted such a role." Id. at 776.
20. 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952) (no standing for la-
bor union in suit against employers who conspired to hire only nonunion employees).
It was not, however, until four years later that that target area analysis was used in
a manner to reach results inconsistent with prior decisions of the direct injury approach.
Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 1955). In Karseal
a plaintiff who manufactured automobile polishes alleged that defendant Richfield's ex-
clusive dealing arrangements with independent service stations hindered his ability to
make sales to these service stations. The plaintiff, Karseal, had sold its products to inde-
pendent distributors who, in turn, sold the products to the service stations. The lack
of privity between Karseal and the service stations was deemed immaterial. Thus, Rich-
field's direct injury argument that any cause of action resulting from its sales would ac-
crue only to the distributors of Karseal's products, and not Karseal, was rejected. The
court, reasoning that Richfield's sales scheme was aimed at excluding competing prod-
ucts, defined the target area as commerce in petroleum products and automotive acces-
sories. Furthermore, "Karseal was not only hit, but was aimed at, by Richfield." Id.
at 365. As a result Karseal was granted standing to maintain its treble damage suit.
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committed which harms him. He must show that he is within
that area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown
of competitive conditions in a particular industry. Otherwise
he is not injured "by reason" of anything forbidden in the
anti-trust laws.2'
As applied, the target area approach involves two determinations.
First, the target of the defendant's alleged violation must be defined-the
sector of the economy at which the violation was "aimed. ' 22  Second,
the plaintiff must establish that his injured commercial activity is within
this area of the economy. Theoretically, anyone found within this area
of impact is directly injured by reason of his position therein. The
bewildering problem is trying to identify this target area. When the
target is defined narrowly,23 or when the target area is used to define the
persons at whom the illegal conduct was directed,24 the test becomes a
hybrid of the direct injury test with the same results. However, by
incorporating the concept of foreseeability, the target area test can
provide a more expansive approach to treble damage standing than the
mechanical direct injury approach. 25
The direct injury and target area theories have been adopted by the
circuit courts with varying degrees of consistency. In this respect the
law of private antitrust standing is in a very unsatisfactory state, since
some courts apply both tests, 26 some courts apply one test, but call it the
other,2 7 and one court has refused to recognize any distinction between
the two.2" Nevertheless, these two approaches, appearing in one form
or another, represent the traditional views of the circuits. In addition to
21. 193 F.2d at 54-55.
22. The term "aimed at" relates to the area of foreseeable impact affected by the
violation. It does not mean that a defendant must have subjectively intended to harm
a specific plaintiff. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190,
220 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964).
23. Omo ST. L.J., supra note 4, at 732.
24. See Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454
F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
25. One commentator has urged the adoption of the target area analysis as the sole
test for section 4 standing, stating that "virtually all federal courts have already accepted
the principle, implicitly if not in name." Pollock, supra note 4, at 706.
26. See, e.g., Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.,
454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); South Carolina Coun-
cil of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
934 (1966).
27. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Perkins, 396 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 395
U.S. 642 (1969) (court labeled approach "target area," but employed "direct injury"
analysis).
28. See Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv., Inc. v. Association of Cas. & Sur. Cos.,
382 F.2d 925, 928 (10th Cir. 1967).
1976]
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the specific criticisms already mentioned, there is an ongoing battle over
whether these traditional rules governing standing in private antitrust
actions should be supplanted with a more liberal standing test.
C. AUTHORITY IN FAVOR OF A LIBERALIZED
STANDING REQUIREMENT
The Supreme Court has never expressly approved the judicially
imposed standing restrictions peculiar to section 4. In fact, the Court
has suggested several times that these standing tests may be unduly
restrictive.2 9 On one occasion it was noted that the "Court should not
add requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifi-
cally set forth by Congress in [the antitrust] laws."30  Although several
Supreme Court opinions have severely undercut the direct injury ration-
ale,3 1 providing some indication that the Court favors more liberal
standing under section 4, it has since denied certiorari in cases where the
plaintiff lost on causal connection grounds. 2
Aside from the fact that the Supreme Court has never accepted the
strict standing rules, it should be noted that the Clayton Act does not
mention them. The Act, by allowing "any person" to file a suit
provided that he is injured in his business or property by reason of an
antitrust violation,33 would appear to necessitate only proof of harm
caused by the violation. This statutory language was made intentionally
broad, reflecting the purpose of the Clayton Act to ensure a vigorous
29. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660
(1961), where the Court said: "ff1o state a claim upon which relief can be granted
under [section 1 of the Sherman Act], allegations adequate to show a violation and, in
a private treble damage action, that plaintiff was damaged thereby are all the law re-
quires." (Emphasis added.) Also see Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 137-140 (1968); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S.
445, 454 (1957); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219, 236 (1948); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265-66
(1946). In light of these opinions, one commentator has suggested that it is doubtful
"whether, if presented with the issue, the Court would decree the continuing necessity
of demonstrating that plaintiff is within the target area." Klingsberg, supra note 11,
at 368.
30. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957).
31. See, e.g., Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969), where the
Court said that "artificial limitations" of causal connection are completely unwarranted.
"If there is sufficient evidence in the record to support an inference of causation, the
ultimate conclusion as to what that evidence proves is for the jury." Id. at 648. Al-
though the case did not involve section 4 of the Clayton Act, the Court revealed its
general disenchantment with direct-indirect analysis.
32. See, e.g., Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.,
454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Billy Baxter, Inc.
v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971).
33. See note 3 supra.
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antitrust enforcement policy through private litigation.34  Indeed, when
the Clayton Act was passed there was strong congressional support for
the private antitrust suit35 and various features of the Act mirror this
attitude. Criminal sanctions were deleted to avoid strict construction,
thus enhancing the private action as an alternative to government en-
forcement.3 6 Incentives to private action include the treble damages
provision, the absence of an "amount in controversy" requirement 37 and
an authorization for the recovery of litigation costs.3 ' These statutory
features, read in light of the legislative history of the Act, appear to be
inconsistent with the limiting constructions of section 4 standing. Since
it is, after all, the plain language of the statute which Congress approves
or disapproves, critics maintain that the courts should not allow that
language and its overriding purpose to be significantly undercut by im-
posing additional burdens on private plaintiffs.39
In reality, these judicially developed rules are not standing rules at
all-they are rules of proximate cause. 40  In this sense, critics argue that
the application of such rules is inappropriate at the standing phase of the
litigation, since the court, by arbitrarily resolving the factual issue of
proximate cause, is invading the province of the jury.4' Moreover, the
decisions utilizing these concepts are characterized by the use of such
cryptic labels as "remote," "indirect," "incidental" and "target area"
which offer little in the way of an underlying principle to guide potential
claimants and the district courts. One writer has suggested that these
terms are "only verbal formulas used by a court to express its conclusion
34. Congress was seeking an "army" of private litigants as an additional deterrent
to antitrust violations. Senator Borah observed that "[there could be no safer guardian
for the Sherman Antitrust Law than the hundreds and thousands of people who are in-
jured by these monopolies if the law were made easy of enforcement so far as they are
concerned." 51 CONG. REC. 15,986 (1914).
35. Congressman Webb observed: "Thus the offender will begin to open his eyes
because you are threatening to take money out of his pocket." 51 CONG. REc. 16,275
(1914). The extraordinary sweep of the Clayton Act has been recognized by numerous
authorities. For a more detailed analysis of the legislative history of section 4 see
Thomas, A Challenge to Conglomerates: Private Treble Damages Suits, 3 LOYOLA
U.L.A.L. REv. 292 (1970).
36. The threat of private treble damage suits was considered to be more of a deter-
rent to antitrust violations than criminal sanctions. 51 CoNG. REc. 16,319 (1914) (re-
marks of Congressman Floyd).
37. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). The text of this section is given in
note 3 supra.
38. Id.
39. COLUTM. L. Rnv., supra note 4, at 588; OHIo ST. L.J., supra note 4, at 726.
40. C. HILLS, AN~rrrJsT AvisER § 12.27, at 569 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
HILLs].
41. Id. See also Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969).
1976]
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that. . . the defendant should not be compelled to pay treble damages
to the plaintiff."4  One circuit court has described this avoidance of
section 4 merits as "[transforming] judicial inquiry into a mere search
for labels. 43
While some courts use the standing doctrines to completely avoid
adjudication of the merits, others utilize these doctrines to intensively
examine the merits at the standing phase of the litigation.44 Traditional
notions of standing reject such an approach at this preliminary stage.45
Presently, the section 4 defendant who raises the standing issue not only
gets a preview of the plaintiff's case,4 but he may also "avoid adjudica-
tion on violation and damages, even though there may have been a
violation resulting in substantial damage to the plaintiff. ''4 7 Since failure
to satisfy these judicially imposed standing requirements results in the
early termination of the lawsuit, critics argue that the purpose of the
Clayton Act would be better served by a disposition of private antitrust
claims on their merits, rather than "clogging the courts with wasteful
motions addressed to the sufficiency of complaints . . .., More-
over, by creating delay in the final disposition of cases, this expensive
and time consuming motion practice is said to discourage legitimate
claimants from seeking redress through the Clayton Act."
42. Thomas, supra note 11, at 645, quoting Pollock, supra note 4, at 699 (emphasis
in original).
43. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 127 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973) (in reference to direct injury analysis). Yet in denying
standing to a group of farmers allegedly injured by an elimination of competition in the
motor vehicle air pollution equipment industry, the court said: "Not only were the crop
farmers not targets of the alleged conspiracy, they were not even on the firing range.
Accordingly, the farmers lack standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act ... " Id.
at 129 (footnote omitted).
44. See, e.g., Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973) (denying standing to employees terminated as the result of
a merger because they failed to show a "lessening of competition"); Billy Baxter, Inc.
v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971) (re-
quiring a comprehensive analysis of the relevant market in the determination of stand-
ing).
45. See cases cited note 1 supra. "The fundamental aspect of standing is that it
focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the
issues he wishes to have adjudicated." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
46. REycnR&r, supra note 12, at 115.
47. Id. at 113. "If the issue is raised in a motion to dismiss, it may even avoid
discovery." Id.
48. Klingsberg, supra note 10, at 355.
49. Id. at 353. See generally Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble
Damage Actions, 4 ANTTRUST BULL. 5 (1959); Loevinger, Private Action-The Strong-
est Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTImusT BuLL. 167 (1958); Parker, The Deterrent Effect
of Private Treble Damage Suits: Fact or Fantasy, 3 N.M.L. Rnv. 286 (1973).
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D. AUTHORITY AGAINST A LIBERALIZED
STANDING REQUIREMENT
Although the Supreme Court has never definitively treated the
standing doctrines judicially imposed on section 4, it has given tacit
approval to the policy considerations behind them. Since antitrust
violations create foreseeable ripples of injury that often flow to countless
parties, the restrictive interpretations are based on what Justice Holmes
termed "the endlessness and futility of the effort to follow every transac-
tion to its ultimate result."5° In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.5 the Court
observed that "[tihe lower courts have been virtually unanimous in
concluding that Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide, a
remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to
an antitrust violation."52 In that case the state of Hawaii was seeking to
recover damages for injury to its general economy. Treble damage
relief was denied to the state suing in its parens patriae capacity, because
of the possibility of duplicative recoveries. 3 Since Hawaii's injury to its
general economy was only "a reflection of injuries to the 'business or
property' of consumers, for which they may recover themselves under
§ 4 ." 54 To permit recovery would be to allow individual citizens and the
state to recover for identical losses.5 5 The avoidance of duplicative
recoveries is a frequently given justification for the restrictive standing
rules.50
Many courts consider the treble damage provision of section 4 to
be a severe penalty for the defendant and a possible windfall for the
plaintiff.5 7  For this reason, "[they] have developed rules designed to
50. Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 534 (1918).
51. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
52. Id. at 262-63 n.14.
53. Id. at 264.
54. Id.
55. The Court could have employed the traditional standing doctrines by ruling that
the injury to the general economy of Hawaii was "remote." Instead, it chose to base
the decision on the avoidance of duplicative recoveries. For this reason Hawaii's atti-
tude concerning section 4 standing is not as strict as it might appear.
56. See generally Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of
Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1016-21 (1952).
57. See, e.g., Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699, 701 (D. Colo.
1970); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D.
Mass. 1956). See also Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312, 317
(E.D. Pa. 1953), affd per curiam, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828
(1954); J. BURNS, ANrTnrUST DILEMMA: WHY CONGRESS SHOULD MODERNIZE THE
AiurrrrUsT LAws 229-32 (1969); Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic
Regulatory Policies, 82 HARv. L. RIv. 1207, 1223 (1969).
1976]
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limit the classes of plaintiffs which can assert an antitrust violation."' ,
The result is a judicial reluctance to permit recovery, demonstrated by
the following language:
In determining the scope of the Act it must be remem-
bered that the treble damage feature is an enforcement pro-
vision and superimposes a penalty upon compensation. As
such it should not be literally construed if unreasonable re-
sults would be reached by so doing. Obviously, there must
be a limit somewhere. It is not possible to formulate any
general rule by which to determine what injuries are too re-
mote to bring a plaintiff within the scope of the Act . . .
The rationing of scarce judicial resources is another justification
for the strict standing doctrines. "[Private treble damage suits] are
notoriously lengthy, some suits covering over ten years in the courts
alone." 60  The courts, fearful of an avalanche of such suits brought
merely for the purpose of "blackmail" settlement or harassment, utilize
the standing rules to "[permit] an early identification of cases in which
the plaintiff will never be able to recover because, as demonstrated by
undisputed facts or by his own complaint, he will never, as a matter of
law, be able to prove injury proximately caused by the defendant." 1 In
this manner the judicial process is relieved of lengthy trials and the bur-
den of tracing through a maze of transactions to ascertain if damages
have been suffered."2
A final, recurrent justification for the narrow standing rules is the
failure of Congress to respond to the causal connection interpretations.
Since the Clayton Act was passed in 1914, numerous cases have dealt
with the often subtle distinctions between those injuries which are too
remote to support a private action and those which are sufficiently
direct. Yet, "Congress has failed to amend the anti-trust laws on this
point in the face of repeated decisions. It seems to have been content
for the judiciary to take a position narrower than that often applied in
non-statutory tort cases and in cases where plaintiffs are not allowed a
multiple recovery." 63 Several courts view this time lapse as significant,
58. Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699, 701 (D. Colo. 1970).
59. Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954).
60. Guilfoil, supra note 19, at 775-76 (footnote omitted).
61. HILLS, supra note 40, at 569.
62. The suits that have excluded stockholders, employees, officers and the like re-
flect these considerations. See cases cited note 18 supra.
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feeling that it would be inappropriate for them to expand their interpre-
tations without further congressional action. 4
H. THE MALAmuD CASE
Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp."5 involved three real estate invest-
ment companies which were allegedly injured by Sinclair's refusal to
financially assist them in acquiring additional service station properties.
In 1965 Sinclair contracted to supply gasoline and other petroleum
products to Malco Petroleum, Inc., a distributorship owned by the
Malamuds. 6 At the same time the parties entered into an oral agree-
ment obligating Sinclair to financially assist the three Malamud invest-
ment companies 17 in their efforts to acquire and develop additional
service station sites. Five acquisitional proposals were submitted to
Sinclair over the next few months, but Sinclair declined assistance in all
of the ventures. After these disapprovals the Malamuds began negotia-
tions with Texaco, hoping to replace Sinclair as their supplier. In 1966,
after signing a distribution agreement with Texaco, the Malamuds un-
successfully sought an early termination of the Sinclair contract. Be-
cause of Sinclair's refusal to terminate, the contract ran its course and
upon expiration the Malamuds placed all of their stations under the
Texaco agreement. Subsequently, three groups of plaintiffs-Jack and
Anne Malamud, the Malco Distributorship and the three real estate
investment firms-instituted an action against Sinclair, alleging viola-
tions of section 1 of the Sherman Act 68 and section 3 of the Clayton
64. See, e.g., Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 733 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973); Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv., Inc. v. Association of
Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382 F.2d 925, 929, (10th Cir. 1967). See also Jones v. New York
Cent. R.R., 182 F.2d 326, 328 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 850 (1950); In re Wis-
consin Co-operative Milk Pool, 119 F.2d 999, 1002 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
655 (1941).
65. 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
66. Jack and Anne Malamud were the officers, directors and sole shareholders of
the four corporate plaintiffs (the distributorship and the three real estate investment
firms). Id. at 1144.
67. Brentwood Corporation, Tobyneil Corporation and Malco Corporation (not to
be confused with Malco Petroleum, the distributor).
68. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV, 1974) states in full:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal: Provided, That nothing contained in
section 1 to 7 of this title shall render illegal, contracts or agreements prescrib-
ing minimum prices for the resale of a commodity which bears, or the label
or container of which bears, the trademark, brand, or name of the producer
or distributor of such commodity and which is in free and open competition
with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others,
when contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as applied to intra-
1976]
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Act.69 The plaintiffs claimed substantial damage "by reason of" Sin-
clair's refusal to provide financial assistance to the investment com-
panies and "by reason of" Sinclair's refusal to allow an early contract
termination.70
At the district court Sinclair argued that all of the plaintiffs lacked
standing to sue, since none of them had been directly injured by any al-
leged antitrust violation. The court, despite its discussion of the test an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,71 relied on a Sixth Circuit deci-
sion72 and dismissed the complaints of the individual plaintiffs and the
state transactions, under any statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in
effect in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia in which such resale
is to be made, or to which the commodity is to be transported for such resale,
and the making of such contracts or agreements shall not be an unfair method
of competition under section 45 of this title: Provided further, That the pre-
ceding proviso shall not make lawful any contract or agreement, providing for
the establishment or maintenance of minimum resale prices on any commodity
herein involved, between manufacturers, or between producers, or between
wholesalers, or between brokers, or between factors, or between retailers, or be-
tween persons, firms, or corporations in competition with each other. Every
person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspir-
acy declared by sections 1 to 7 of this title to be illegal shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both
said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
69. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970) states in full:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or
unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any
Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other
place under the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a price charged there-
for, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement,
or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in
the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of
a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such
lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce.
70. Based on Sinclair's adherence to its contractual rights,
[t]he Malamuds and their corporations each [claimed) substantial damage
in that each [had] lost:
1. Profits from unrealized sales growth; and
2. The unrealized increase in going business value. All plaintiffs except
Malco also [claimed] damage from unrealized growth in real estate equity
ownership.
521 F.2d at 1145. In short, the investment companies were claiming they would have
acquired more service stations but for Sinclair's refusal to financially assist them, and the
Malamuds were claiming that they would have been free to negotiate with other suppli-
ers but for Sinclair's refusal to terminate. Id.
71. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). For a discussion of this case see note 6 supra. The dis-
trict court found that all of the plaintiffs had standing as defined in Data Processing,
but declined to apply that test in view of sixth circuit precedent. 521 F.2d at 1145.
72. Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962),
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distributorship, since neither could possibly establish a sufficiently direct
injury by reason of any antitrust violation."' As to the three investment
companies, however, the court found that mixed questions of law and
fact remained concerning whether Sinclair's refusal caused the invest-
ment companies' injury. Thus, Sinclair's motion for summary judgment
was denied.74
An appeal to the Sixth Circuit involved only the question of the
standing of the three investment firms. The circuit court, after examin-
ing the direct injury and target area approaches, concluded that
as standing doctrines both theories really demand too much
from plaintiffs at the pleading stage of a case ...
The courts have used one or the other of the two ap-
proaches as standing doctrines in order to arrest some anti-
trust litigation at an early stage. As we see it, however, by
using either approach a court is enabled to make a determina-
tion on the merits of a claim under the guise of assessing the
standing of the claimant. Under either theory the entire
question of directness is one that must be resolved upon some
factual showing, but standing is a preliminary determination
ordinarily to be evaluated upon the allegations of the com-
plaint.75
For these reasons the court held that the correct test for standing in
private treble damage actions was the Data Processing test. Although
conceding that this test was developed for use in the area of administra-
tive law involving suits challenging governmental action, the court anal-
ogized a private antitrust action to a public suit,76 since the private
plaintiff seeks to "'vindicate the important public interest in free
competition.' -77 Then, adopting both prongs of the Data Processing
test,78 the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the three
investment companies had standing.7"
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963). For this case's alliance with the "direct injury" ap-
proach see note 87 infra.
73. 521 F.2d at 1145.
74. Id. at 1145-46.
75. Id. at 1149-50 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
76. Id. at 1151.
77. Id., quoting Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,
502. (1969).
78. 521 F.2d at 1152. It is unclear, however, whether the court actually applied
the second prong of the test. See note 90 infra and accompanying text.
79. The court was careful to mention that a grant of standing is no assurance of
success on the merits: "Regardless of what the proof at trial may show, the investment
companies have made sufficient allegations to establish their standing to sue under the
antitrust laws." 521 F.2d at 1152. In addition, the court earlier noted that "a party
may make sufficient allegations to demonstrate the necessary standing to sue but fail
to prove his case on the merits." Id. at 1150.
1976]
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IV. DATA PROCESSING: THE GOLDEN MEAN?
In Data Processing the review granting statute was section 702 of
the Administrative Procedure Act which provides: "A person suffering
legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to
judicial review thereof."' 0 Under this provision a strong presumption in
favor of judicial review of administrative action has developed and
nonreviewability is an exception which must be clearly demonstrated.81
There are similarities between this standing provision and section 4 of
the Clayton Act. Each is worded in broad, rather than specific, terms
and each contains causal connection language. Section 702 of the
Adminstrative Procedure Act grants standing to a person aggrieved by
agency action; section 4 of the Clayton Act grants standing to a person
injured in his business or property. Both sections confer standing on
persons whose causes of action arise from other statutory provisions.82
Although the application of the Data Processing test to cases
involving other types of private action has been rejected by some
courts, 83 the only material difference between public and private suits is
that the defendant in the former case is a government officer or an agen-
cy, while in the latter he is an individual.84 The critical question is how
much significance should be attached to this difference8 5 Without
doubt, the Sixth Circuit accorded little weight to this distinction,80 and as
a result its holding in Malamud represents a distinct departure from the
traditional notions of section 4 standing. By summarily severing its pre-
80. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
81. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970).
82. In Data Processing section 702 was used to grant standing to review an alleged
violation of the Bank Service Corporation Act. In Malamud, section 4 was used to
grant standing to review alleged violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
83. See, e.g., Solien v. Miscellaneous Drivers Local 610, 440 F.2d 124, 132 (8th
Cir.), cert denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971) (NLRB injunction case); Postal Workers, De-
troit Local v. Independent Postal Serv. of America, 349 F. Supp. 1297 (E.D. Mich.
1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1973') (postal case). But see National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers v. Independent Postal Sys. of America, Inc., 470 F.2d 265, 270-71 (10th
Cir. 1972) (postal case); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1158 (9th
Cir. 1971), rev'd, 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (racial discrimination case); Colligan v. Activi-
ties Club, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 691-92 (2d Cir. 1971) (Lanham Act case); Herpich v.
Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 805-10 (5th Cir. 1970) (SEC case).
84. The defendant in Data Processing was Camp, Comptroller of the Currency. The
defendant in Malamud was Sinclair, a private corporation.
85. One commentator insists that "tlo liberalize standing in suits against the gov-
ernment without following the same philosophy in private antitrust suits would be to give
the private corporate defendant an advantage not enjoyed by the government." Thomas,
supra note 11, at 656.
86. See 521 F.2d at 1151.
[Vol. 11:542
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vious ties with the direct injury approach sr and by declining to adopt the
target area approach which could have produced the same result,"" the
court signaled its intention to go beyond the two existing theories and
adopt a liberal, more expansive interpretation of section 4 standing. But
only future applications can tell whether the Sixth Circuit's "zone of
interests" will be broader than the "target area" and whether "injury in
fact" will be given a more expansive interpretation than "injury within
the target area." In the meantime, however, the Malamud decision has
created uncertainties of its own.
In Data Processing the Supreme Court announced a two-prong test
for standing to obtain judicial review of administrative action: whether
there is an allegation of injury in fact and "whether the interest sought to
be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests
. . . [of the relevant] statute or constitutional guarantee in question." s9
It is unclear whether the Sixth Circuit in Malamud applied both prongs
of this test. Judging from its opinion, the two prongs of the Data
Processing test appear to have been merged into one, due to the court's
liberal construction of the zone of interests requirement. 0 If this is true
the standing test adopted by the Sixth Circuit is even more liberal than it
appears on its face, since the zone of interest requirement would be
87. The court distinguished its earlier decision in Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A.
Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963)
(which had held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover in a private antitrust action
because he was too remote from the violation) on the grounds that there the court was
considering the merits, and not the issue of standing. 521 F.2d at 1150-51. The com-
mentators, however, have been virtually unanimous in aligning the Sixth Circuit with
the "direct injury" approach on the basis of the Volasco decision. See, e.g., HLLs, supra
note 40, at 570; Beane, supra note 4, at 352; CoLUM. L. REv., supra note 4, at 583;
DicK. L. REv., supra note 4, at 77.
88. Since the district court had granted standing to the investment companies based
on Volasco, the circuit court could have simply affirmed on "direct injury" concepts. Or
the court could have found standing for the investment companies by the adoption of
the target area approach-by defining the target area of the alleged violation as includ-
ing the commercial interests of the investment companies and declaring the companies'
injuries to be within that target area. Instead, the court adopted the Data Processing
analysis.
89. 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (emphasis added).
90. In Data Processing an analysis of the legislative history and underlying policy
of the Administrative Procedure Act (the review granting statute) and the Bank Service
Corporation Act (the relevant statute) was made to determine the zone of interests. See
id. at 154-57. However, Malamud, after specifying section 1 of the Sherman Act and
section 3 of the Clayton Act as the relevant statutes, found the plaintiffs within the zone
of interests simply because "[tihe antitrust laws were enacted to preserve competition
and thereby to protect the individual plaintiff and the consuming public from the effects
of any combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade." 521 F.2d at 1152. Under
this sweeping rationale it seems as though any plaintiff who alleged injury because of
an antitrust violation would thereby satisfy the zone of interests requirement.
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automatically satisfied by the plaintiff who alleges injury in fact.01 The
court seems to have applied the spirit of Data Porcessing, without
insisting upon substantive compliance with the test.
Assuming, however, that the court meant to apply both prongs of
the test, another uncertainty results. One of its reasons for rejecting the
direct injury and target area approaches was that their application goes
to the merits of the case.9" The Data Processing test was thought to be
a better alternative because it was fashioned by the Supreme Court for
the very purpose of avoiding examinations of the merits.9 3 Yet, the
Data Processing test has been criticized for the reason that it permits
such examinations through the zone of interests inquiry. According to
Justice Brennan, who dissented in that case,94 this inquiry, by requiring
91. Several commentators have advocated "injury in fact" as the sole requisite for
standing in the federal courts. See, e.g., Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37
U. Cm. L. Rnv. 450 (1970); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. Rv. 633 (1971);
Sedler, Standing, Justiciability, and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAIND. L. Rv.
479 (1972). After discussing recent developments in the law of standing, Malamud ap-
peared to be well on its way to expressly adopting a single-prong "injury in fact" test
for section 4:
Although the statute is broadly worded and reflects a similarly expansive con-
gressional enforcement policy, by its very terms it does not grant access to the
courts to persons interested merely as members of the public in enforcing the
various antitrust laws. The statute defines the real party in interest as being
any person who has been injured. This definition would seem also to comport
with the minimum requirements of Article Il of the Constitution, i.e., injury
in fact ....
... Clearly provided for under Section 4 is the requirement that any per-
son must have suffered injury at the hands of the defendant before he can bring
an action. This prerequisite both defines the real party in interest and satisfies
the minimum criterion established by Article I.
521 F.2d at 1148-49 (emphasis in original). Despite these observations, the court pur-
ported to adopt both prongs of the Data Processing test. Its application of the test, how-
ever, appears to be in the nature of a single-prong "injury in fact" approach. See note
40 supra.
92. See 521 F.2d at 1150. Actually, it is not uncommon for courts to examine as-
pects of the merits in determining the standing of the litigant as the Supreme Court re-
cently pointed out in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975):
Although standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's con-
tention that particular conduct is illegal . . . it often turns on the nature and
source of the claim asserted. . . . Moreover, the source of the plaintiffs claim
to relief assumes critical importance with respect to the prudential rules of
standing that, apart from Art. Ill's minimum requirements, serve to limit the
role of the courts in resolving public disputes.
Id. at 500 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Because of the function of standing
as a rule of judicial self-restraint, as well as its function under article II, a merit free
determination of standing seems pretentious. The real criticism of the traditional see-
tion 4 standing doctrines lies not in the fact that they allow the merits to be examined,
but in that they often permit courts to either completely avoid the merits or to prejudge
them. See notes 40-46 supra and accompanying text.
93. See note 6 supra.
94. Justice Brennan concurred in the result and dissented in both Data Processing
and its companion case, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
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an investigation of the relevant statutory materials, allows courts to
extensively examine the merits before making a determination of stand-
ing." Such an examination, he maintained, is both constitutionally
unnecessary and entirely inappropriate to the resolution of standing. For
this reason he advocated the adoption of a single-prong injury in fact
test for the disposition of standing issues.96
Thus, while the Data Processing test was initially developed to
avoid an examination of the merits in the resolution of standing, the
zone of interest inquiry shows a potential for that very abuse. Although
this inquiry is assured a liberal interpretation by the Sixth Circuit, that is
no assurance that other federal courts utilizing the test will attach the
same generous construction. It is entirely possible, for example, for
courts presently adhering to the direct injury approach to reach tradi-
tional direct injury results with an application of the Data Processing
test. After an examination of the relevant statutory materials, a court
could conclude that Congress simply did not intend to spread section 4
protection so far.97  Such an implementation of the zone of interest
inquiry would merely perpetuate the judicial glosses already character-
istic of the existing theories and no real change would be effectuated by
the adoption of Data Processing.9 8 In short, it is not clear how far the
95. The Constitution requires for standing only that the plaintiff allege that ac-
tual harm resulted to him from the agency action. Investigation to determine
whether the constitutional requirement has been met has nothing in common
with the inquiry into statutory language, legislative history, and public policy
that must be made to ascertain whether Congress has precluded or limited ju-
dicial review. . . . The Court's approach does too little to guard against the
possibility that judges will use standing to slam the courthouse door against
plaintiffs who are entitled to full consideration of their claims on the merits.
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 178 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting and concurring
in part) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
96. Id. at 167-68, 176. Several commentators have agreed with Brennan's views.
See note 91 supra. Other commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court has
since retreated from the "zone of interests" inquiry. See, e.g., Hasl, Standing Revis-
ited-The Aftermath of Data Processing, 18 ST. L.U.L.J. 12, 21 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Hasl]. Yet, despite these views, the zone of interests inquiry appears to remain
part of the current standing test, as recently indicated by the Supreme Court in Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). After recognizing that standing may exist solely by
virtue of specific statutes, the Court said: "Essentially, the standing question . . . is
whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can
be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief."
Id. at 500 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This language is strikingly similar to
the zone of interests inquiry in Data Processing.
97. Although such a conclusion would have dubious validity in light of the legisla-
tive history of the Clayton Act (see notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text), this re-
sult would not be surprising in view of the often encountered judicial bias concerning
section 4 liability. See text accompanying notes 42-43 & 57-59 supra.
98. Future applications of this test by other courts will most likely turn on the em-
phasis given to the word arguably in the "zone of interests" inquiry. See Hasl, supra
note 96, at 33.
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Malamud trend will carry, or what sort of standing requirement will
remain when it has run its course.
There is, however, much to be said for the position of the court in
Malamud. While its application of Data Processing will not satisfy the
demands of those who would reject all but the single-pronged injury in
fact test,99 it may nevertheless help to avoid some of the confusion which
has characterized private antitrust standing. First, the court's holding
identifies the Sixth Circuit as one in which plaintiffs are assured a liberal
construction of section 4 standing. In light of the generous venue
provisions afforded by the Clayton Act,100 this holding becomes in-
creasingly significant. Since chances of success may vary from district
to district depending on the various causal connection interpretations, it
might be advisable for plaintiffs to take their case to the Sixth Circuit if
there is any question about standing. 1 1 Although the Malamud hold-
ing gives no assurance of success on the merits, 10 2 the Sixth Circuit has
warranted that it will not arbitrarily halt antitrust litigation at an early
stage, but will examine all the facts on the merits before deciding the
issue of proximate cause. Under the traditional approaches standing of-
ten depends on whether the alleged injury was proximately caused by
the violation; therefore, standing to sue and causation are frequently
treated interchangeably. The Malamud decision represents an attempt
to separate these two issues, assuring section 4 claimants an opportunity
to prove their charges.' 3
More importantly, the adoption of the Data Processing test has the
effect of shifting the section 4 standing focus from proximate causation
to statutory purpose. The test, by requiring an examination of the
relevant statutory materials, inevitably places the legislative purpose of
the Clayton Act-as an additional deterrent to antitrust violations-at
99. See views of Justice Brennan, notes 94-96 supra and accompanying text, and of
commentators cited note 91 supra.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) states in pertinent part: "Any person who shall be in-
jured in his business or property . . . may sue therefore in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent
." (Emphasis added.)
101. Currently, there is a powerful incentive for the defendant to raise the directness
issue. Free to argue the assorted multitude of lower federal court decisions, experience
has shown that the defendant may be able to secure the most favorable ruling possible:
the avoidance of a trial. The Malamud holding avoids the risks accompanying the un-
certainties of the traditional approaches.
102. See note 79 supra.
103. The court has not removed the causal connection requirement, but rather has




Phillips: Standing to Sue in Antitrust: The Application of Data Processing
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1975
STANDING TO SUE IN ANTITRUST
the forefront of section 4 standing inquiries. Both the direct injury and
target area tests fail in this respect.10 4  By postponing a determination
of proximate cause, the Malamud court is admittedly placing a greater
burden on judicial resources. Yet, a remedy which was designed to
play an integral role in the enforcement of the antitrust laws should not
be foreclosed prematurely merely to lighten the load of the federal
courts. 1 5
The Malamud application of Data Processing actually creates a
presumption in favor of the right of action, 0 6 assuring a penetrating
search for possible antitrust violations. It is only in this manner that
private antitrust suits, as an alternative to government action, can help
ensure a vigorous enforcement policy in this important area of the law.
This is not to say that courts should abandon standards which preclude
spurious claims and avoid the possibility of duplicative recoveries
against antitrust violators. But these competing considerations can be
satisfied without vitiating the effectiveness of the statute.10 7  The Data
Processing test offers the potential for striking the appropriate balance
between the rival section 4 goals of enforcement and prudent limita-
tion. 08
Yet, if the Malamud application of the Data Processing test is to
truly effect a sensible accommodation in this troubled area of the law,
the decision could best aid in alleviating the causal connection confusion
by prompting Supreme Court treatment of the problem. Section 4 of
the Clayton Act, like the other antitrust provisions, is characterized by
104. The previous tests have concentrated more on causation and less on section 4.
The zone of interests inquiry (requiring an examination of statutory purpose) is a much
needed addition to section 4 standing considerations, since the uncertainty surrounding
the two traditional approaches possibly has done more to deter legitimate claimants than
antitrust violators. See Guilfoil, supra note 19, at 775; Klingsberg, supra note 10, at
353; COLUM. L. REV., supra note 4, at 587.
105. COLuM. L. RaV., supra note 4, at 588. But see Timberlake, The Legal Injury
Requirements and Proof of Damages in Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust
Laws, 30 GEo. WASH. L REV. 231, 249 (1961).
106. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
107. The Malamud court, for example, indicated that although the question of direct-
ness would normally entail an adversary hearing, directness could be evaluated upon a
motion for summary judgment where the material facts are not in issue. 521 F.2d at
1150 n.13; see COLUM. L. Rlv., supra note 4, at 588.
108. The mere presence of the words "allege" and "arguably" in the Data Processing
test should avoid summary dismissals based on conclusory labels, while at the same time
giving no assurance of success on the merits. By requiring only the allegation of injury
in fact and interests that fall arguably within the zone of interests protected, other courts
applying the test should spend less time with "wasteful motions addressed to the suffi-
ciency of complaints where they might better spend their time disposing of legitimate
claims on the merits." Klingsberg, supra note 10, at 355.
1976]
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such an extraordinary sweep that a definitive answer can come only
from the Supreme Court, and then only because of its finality in our
judicial process."0 9 Possibly such treatment will be forthcoming, since
Malamud has enlarged the causal connection conflict-now there are
three circuit tests, instead of two.110 Neither of the previous tests are
satisfactory"1  and the new entrant contains uncertainties of its own.112
Even the most astute antitrust attorney is unable to understand causal
connection to any explainable point, since the answers are not found in
logic or the application of a formula. ' 3  Although "[ilt may .. .be
argued that the purpose and language of this legislation are so sweeping
that any person injured by the proscribed conduct should be considered
within the class which Congress intended to protect[,] 13" 4 the courts
are unlikely to accept this simplistic approach to the problem. And the
answer does not lie in total abandonment of the existing approaches. If
the Data Processing test is to yield definitive standing guidelines for
potential plaintiffs and the district courts to follow and is to be applied in
a way that it deters antitrust violators, instead of legitimate claimants,
Supreme Court endorsement and clarification is essential. Perhaps the
Malamud decision will aid in provoking this long awaited intervention
by the high Court.
Layn R. Phillips
109. The Supreme Court has been among the most liberal interpreters of the antitrust
laws. See, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948); Story Parchment Co.
v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
110. This conflict is further compounded by the various hybrids of these tests. See
notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text.
111. See notes 18-49 supra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 89-98 supra and accompanying text.
113. Thomas, supra note 11, at 645.
114. Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699, 702-03 (D. Colo. 1970).
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